QAnon is obviously a goofball cult. Its distinctive appeal is to feed revenge fantasies (that is also an appeal of various ideological movements, but I want to stay focused here). It uses a great many known psychological tactics to inculcate a feeling of personal participation and insider knowledge about its conspiracy theory. This goes beyond most cults because the Q followers feel empowered as actual active members of an elite revolutionary cadre.
My comments are based on personal knowledge of a Q follower, miscellaneous news reports, some casual internet research, and, most of all, on more than 50 years of reading and desultory contacts with various cultists (for example, I was once assaulted by aggressive scientologists who were handing out literature on upper Connecticut Ave in Washington, D.C.). My academic interest in conspiracy theory arose from an even deeper interest in mass hysteria events. The two share a lot of characteristics; one could say that conspiracy theories are slow-motion mass hysteria.
The government and the pubic alike generally have a very poor understanding of the causes and dynamics of conspiracy theories (CTs). My touchstone has long been an observation made by G.K. Chesterton more than 100 years ago: Those who begin by believing in nothing, often end up believing in everything (my paraphrase from memory). The best single source to begin building an understanding of the subject (and more broadly about all mass movements) is Eric Hofferâs seminal work, The True Believer.
The QAnon narrative, like many post-modern CTs, only more so, tries to be all-encompassing. It is to CT what the âTheory of Everythingâ is to sub-atomic physics. This broadens its appeal to various prejudices, even as it reduces itself to incoherence. The technique was presaged by The Illuminatus Trilogy (1975), a satirical fantasy that was a bestselling phenomenon.
Traditionally, cults flowed from strong-willed, charismatic leaders. Therefore, it was initially surprising to see that internet cults can be similarly successful despite the lack of a palpable leader. Except perhaps for a few government agents, nobody knows the identity or motives of Q, which could even be a committee. Weirdly, followers and critics alike accept Qâs claims at face value. Q might well be a low-level intelligence community employee who is playing out a wannabe fantasy. Or he (she, it?) might, more seriously, be an agent provocateur. Or could be anything in between. The growth of QAnon shows the undeserved aura of authority that surrounds the web even though most people know it is notoriously unreliable. Like most CTs, the Q narrative gains credibility despite its incoherence by using a blizzard of pseudo-references. If you trace some of these strands, you eventually find that they are self-references, a closed network that is no more than a loop, or an infinite regression of CTs within CTs, or weird interpretation of misunderstood facts.
With all that said, the article under discussion does little more than highlight another aspect of the information fog. With a movement like this, it is possible for anyone to come along and chew off a piece for himself. A guy named Protzman, who is more palpable but no more substantive, apparently claims the mantle of QAnon for himself, spouts nonsense that must confuse even ârealâ Q followers, and is taken at face value. Waiting for the return of JFK (let alone Jr.) doesnât fit what I know of QAnon. But of course anyone today can speak for QAnon, and who can say otherwise. This is the fog. The body of CTs about JFK over more than 50 years have sprung from the left, as deflection from the inconvenient fact that he was assassinated by a Communist who had once defected to the Soviet Union. Hence you have JFK CTs about the Mob, the CIA, Castro payback, etc.
While I agree with Rothschildâs description of the psychological appeal of the QAnon cult, the claim in the ad for his book that it is âembrace[d] by right-wing mediaâ is vague and untrue so far as I know. Tucker Carlson, Mark Levin, and Chris Plante among others have all denounced QAnon. My guess is that he is referring to fringe CT media like Alex Jones.
It is useless to try to argue with CT believers, because they are usually infinitely resourceful at inventing explanations for inconsistencies. To engage is to enter their realm, a maze of funhouse mirrors. I have simply told the Q follower I know that I am not interested in predictions or empty claims. I am only interested in well-documented events. Donât tell me about 50,000 warrants; when 50,000 officials are rounded up and jailed, you can gloat and tell me âI told you so.â This is the âshow me the moneyâ argument. The only way to deal with extreme CT believers is to outwait them. When the apocalypse or other extreme event doesnât happen, they will either sheepishly realize they have been fools, or they will fall into an embittered silence. As Rothschild notes, this may take years (see the Millerites).
Many years ago I declared to friends that the principal problem of modern life (outside the realm of science) is how do you know what is true? The internet has paradoxically made the problem vastly more difficult, due to information overload. You can apply history, logic, psychological analysis, and other means to get at the truth, but the simplest technique is an ancient one: By their fruits they shall be known.
But I think that is just common sense on how governments can/should practically work.
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